Truth vs. relativism in science

In Science and Social Inequality by Sandra Harding, I found a dis­cus­sion on p. 148 of claims to “absolute truth” in sci­ence (and the fear of rel­a­tivism) par­tic­u­larly interesting:

The fear of rel­a­tivism seems odd, also, when we con­sider that in daily life we are able to pro­duce what most peo­ple, includ­ing law courts, regard as ratio­nal jus­ti­fi­ca­tions for our knowl­edge claims. We do not think that such claims are absolutely true, under any con­di­tions, now and for­ever; they are always revis­able if addi­tional evi­dence or a use­ful new con­cep­tual frame­work appears. … Whether we are right or wrong to do so in par­tic­u­lar cases, we rou­tinely and con­fi­dently take such posi­tions with respect to health mat­ters, legal issues, and the every­day choices we must make. The argu­ments between abso­lutists and rel­a­tivists seem to float free of such every­day expe­ri­ences and the ways we think about them.

This kind of prag­matic approach to issues of truth and knowl­edge match my own predilec­tions. I get frus­trated by those who insist that truth is absolute and fight against rel­a­tivism because it will lead to chaos and anar­chy. I also get frus­trated by rel­a­tivists who insist that we can­not judge the world around us because we are sim­ply impos­ing our own cul­tural val­ues on oth­ers. Both posi­tions seem absurd to me, and it’s nice to see a dis­cus­sion of the prag­matic, every­day mid­dle ground (a mid­dle ground I’ve been trained to occupy as a lawyer as well).